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 INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET PROBLEM 
By Bruce E. Cain and Roger G. Noll 
 
Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, California has experienced a recurring budget crisis.  This 
article examines the combined budgets of state and local government and the institutions 
for creating these budgets to ascertain the source of the problem.  The facts are that the 
state collects more taxes and fees as a percent of income than most other states, but local 
government has lower revenues in California.  Total revenues to all governments as a 
percentage of income are very near the national average.  On the expenditure side, the 
state spends less than the average for other states, but local governments spend much 
more.  High local expenditures are financed by revenue transfers from the state that 
account for about 40 percent of the state’s budget.  The cause of California’s unusual 
fiscal relationship is decades of initiatives that more severely constrain local revenues 
than state revenues.  The state has responded by creating a system of state-local transfers 
that allow local governments to face a form of soft budget constraint, leading to excess 
local spending and lack of clear accountability for the state’s recurring fiscal crisis.  
Because the cause is the cumulative effect of numerous state-wide initiatives, the only 
plausible cure is initiative reform and revision of numerous initiatives, which most likely 
can be accomplished only through a state constitutional convention.  All other pending 
reforms are at best palliatives, and many would make the fiscal situation worse. 
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INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET PROBLEM 
By Bruce E. Cain and Roger G. Noll
1 
 
I.  Introduction 
California has a serious and persistent budget problem that first emerged in the early 
1990s and became more severe in the new millennium.  The most visible aspect of the problem is 
an annual fiscal crisis.  The crisis begins with a projected budget deficit, which then precipitates 
a legislative battle over the combination of tax increases and expenditure cuts that must be 
adopted to satisfy the state constitutional requirement to balance the budget.  The June deadline 
for passing a budget usually is missed, causing shut-downs of many state programs, substitution 
of IOUs for payments to vendors that supply goods and services to state agencies, and collateral 
budget crises for local governments which cannot adopt budgets in a timely fashion due to 
uncertainties about the magnitude and composition of state transfers.  When finally passed, the 
budget typically includes accounting gimmicks to achieve balance, thereby passing on the crisis 
to the next budget cycle.  The political consequence of frequent budget crises is a continuing 
decline in citizens’ approval of state officials, as exemplified by the low performance ratings of 
the state legislature and all recent governors as they leave office, regardless of party or ideology. 
The less apparent and more contested aspect of California’s budget problem is how 
California’s political institutions contribute to the recurring crisis.  Whereas citizens, responding 
to the visible aspect of the budget problem, tend to blame elected officials for failing to adopt a 
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timely budget, policy analysts tend to emphasize the budgetary effects of California’s political 
institutions.
2  Some argue that the primary source of the budget problem is the two-thirds vote 
requirement in each house of the legislature to pass a budget or a bill that raises taxes.  Others 
argue that California’s budget problem is caused by the design of the election system, including 
the semi-closed primary (eliminated by a June 2010 initiative), weak regulation of campaign 
finance, term limits, and the system for drawing boundaries for state legislative districts 
(replaced by a Citizens Redistricting Commission in a 2008 initiative).  Some also argue that the 
budget problem is exacerbated by the fragmented state executive branch, which diffuses 
accountability and erects barriers to comprehensive budget planning.  Finally, some analysts 
conclude that the root cause of California’s budget problem is the initiative process.  Initiatives 
affect the budget directly by limiting taxes while increasing expenditures, and indirectly in that 
most of the other governance problems were created by ballot measures.  
While these institutions factor into California’s fiscal problems, we believe that an 
additional distinctively dysfunctional element of California governance is the fiscal relationship 
between state and local governments.  Most local government expenditures in California are paid 
from revenue transfers from the state through an opaque process that blurs the connection 
between the provision of public services by local governments and the costs of these services.  
The misalignment of revenue responsibility and decisions about the level and composition of 
local government services encourages irresponsible budgeting.  Moreover, because the 
institutions that create these perverse incentives are hard-wired into the state constitution, they 
are difficult if not impossible for elected officials to change, even if they recognize and seek to 
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correct the problem.  Our primary conclusion is that until the political institutions that create 
perverse incentives are fixed, California’s fiscal problems will persist, especially during 
economic downturns. 
To elucidate the basis for our conclusion, this article analyzes the uniqueness of 
California’s budget problem by identifying how both budgets and the process for creating them 
differ between California and other states.  The next section reviews recent data to ascertain 
precisely where revenues and expenditures of state and local governments diverge between 
California and other states.  The value of this exercise is that it identifies whether the annual 
budget crisis and the attendant widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of government 
on budget issues are due to a combined state and local government budget that is outside the 
range of normal outcomes in the U.S.  To some, this exercise is uninteresting.  Citizens, public 
commentators and political leaders whose policy preferences lie outside the range of normal 
political outcomes in the U.S. are likely perpetually to be dissatisfied with the budget, regardless 
of how one state’s public sector compares with another.  But if the distribution of Californians 
across the ideological spectrum does not differ dramatically from the ideological distribution of 
citizens in other states, this exercise is interesting because it sheds light on whether public 
dissatisfaction with budgeting in California has a basis in the size and composition of state and 
local government budgets. 
The principal findings from this analysis are that, taking into account all taxes and fees, 
California is not a high-tax state, expenditures on state government functions in California are 
below the national norm, and local government expenditures are substantially higher while local 
government tax revenues are substantially lower than in most other states.  The unusual aspect of 
California’s system of public finance is that the state collects an atypically large proportion of   4
total revenues but gives an atypically high proportion of these revenues to local governments.  If 
widespread dissatisfaction with the California budget process has a basis in budget outcomes, the 
cause is the allocation of responsibility between state and local government, with the state 
responsible for the politically unpopular task of raising taxes and local governments responsible 
for the politically popular task of providing services.  This anomaly gives rise to a political 
puzzle:  why do state elected officials persistently accommodate atypically high local 
government expenditures while starving state programs? 
Section III addresses this puzzle.  This section identifies unique features of California’s 
political environment that plausibly could lead to greater decentralization of the expenditure side 
of the budget than occurs in other states.  Among these are heterogeneous demand for public 
services among local communities, the cumulative effect of decades of initiatives that constrain 
taxes and increase spending, the size of legislative districts, and the effect of term limits.  But an 
additional cause of California’s budget problem is that state-local fiscal relations in California 
have created a form of “soft budget constraint” for local governments.  Atypically high state 
revenues, local expenditures, and transfers from the state to local government cause the “price” 
to local voters of incremental local services, as measured by the incremental taxes and fees they 
pay, to be substantially below the incremental cost of those services, thereby encouraging local 
governments to overspend.  Political institutions lead state legislators to accommodate high local 
spending by increasing state revenues and cutting expenditures on state programs. 
Section IV analyzes various pending institutional reform initiative measures in California 
to determine the extent to which these proposals address the root causes of budget deficits and so 
would be likely to have a significant impact on the state’s budget problem.  The November 2010 
state ballot contains several propositions that have important budgetary implications.  Other   5
reform proposals either have qualified for the ballot in February 2012 (the presidential primary) 
or are in the process of gathering signatures for qualification.  Some propositions would affect 
the budget directly by changing the tax system or altering expenditures.  Others would affect the 
budget indirectly by changing the process for making decisions about revenues and expenditures. 
We conclude that these proposals are unlikely to solve the state’s budget problem 
because they do not directly address the underlying causes of the state’s persistent fiscal crisis:  
the cumulative effect of numerous popular initiatives, which has been to constrain taxes while 
increasing expenditures, thereby causing the budget to be increasingly inflexible and difficult to 
balance;  local heterogeneity of the citizenry that creates an incentive to decentralize expenditure 
decisions;  concentration of revenue generation in the state government;  and the mismatch 
between the source of revenues and decisions about expenditures, which undermines 
accountability for the balance between revenues and expenditures.  To fix the underlying 
problem will require either a large number of coordinated initiatives or a constitutional 
convention that completely retools the state’s political institutions. 
 
II.  California State and Local Public Finance 
To assess the nature of the budget problem in California, this section reviews the details 
of the budgets of state and local governments in the U.S. to identify how California differs from 
other states.  The articles in this issue by Professor Alan Auerbach on taxation and D. Roberick 
Kiewiet on government employee pensions deal with pieces of the problem. 
Professor Auerbach shows that California is roughly in the middle in terms of total 
taxation by state and local governments, but that California differs from other states with respect 
to the relative importance of different taxes.  In particular, California has relatively low property   6
taxes but relatively high individual and corporate income taxes.  The effects of this difference are 
that in California the state receives a much larger fraction of total tax collections and total tax 
revenues are more cyclically sensitive.  Professor Kiewiet shows that California’s pension funds 
for state and local employees are both generous and underfunded, creating a potential time bomb 
for future budgets.  But Professor Kiewiet also shows that California’s pension problem is not 
unique and that pension funds in California are less underfunded than in many other states. 
This article complements the other two by examining all state and local revenues and 
expenditures by California’s state and local governments, using data from the annual survey of 
state and local public finance by the U.S. Census Bureau.  This source of data is not perfect.  The 
data come from a survey of local governments.  The survey responses are not necessarily 
accurate, and are subject to a sampling error of about 3 percent in total revenues and 
expenditures and about 5 percent in specific revenue and expenditure categories.
3  Coverage is 
most problematic for special districts, which often are small and may not report as accurately.  
Nevertheless, the sample includes all states and all of the most populous cities and counties.  
These entities account for most state and local revenues and expenditures, and implement the 
most important state and local programs.  Hence, these data provide useful insights about state 
and local budgets and the causes of California’s budget problem. 
A shortcoming of currently available census data is that it does not reflect the full impact 
of the current recession.  The most recent data are from fiscal 2008, which for most states began 
in July or October of 2007.  Thus, the data reflect the start of the recession that began in late 
2007, but not the financial crisis beginning in September 2008.  Because California’s state and 
local budgets are highly sensitive to the business cycle, the 2009 and 2010 data, when available, 
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are certain to show a relative deterioration in California’s financial condition after 2008. 
 
A.  Revenues 
Table 1 summarizes the key budget items in 2008 for California and for all state and local 
governments in the U.S.  Table 2 contains a summary for fiscal 2005 to facilitate comparison 
between recession and full employment.  Both tables show California’s share in national state 
and local revenues and expenditures.  The baseline for the comparison is California’s share of 
gross domestic product (gdp).
4 
In 2008 California’s estimated share of U.S. gdp (13.0 percent) was slightly lower than 
California’s shares of state and local revenues (13.3 percent) and state and local taxes (13.2 
percent), but substantially lower than the state’s share of total state and local expenditures (14.6 
percent).  The revenue and tax shares are not statistically significantly different from gdp share.  
The data show that in 2008 California was an average revenue state but a high expenditure state. 
In 2005 (Table 2) the state’s shares of gdp (13.2 percent), state taxes (13.4 percent), and 
total revenues (15.1 percent) were higher, but the state’s share of spending was lower (14.3 
percent).  California’s combined state and local budget was in surplus in 2005 by 6.5 percent of 
total revenues, while in 2008 the combined budget was in deficit by 6.7 percent of total revenues. 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the high sensitivity of California’s total government 
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revenue to the business cycle.  The data also show that California state and local governments 
smooth expenditures over the business cycle.  California accounted for 34 percent of the total 
deficit of all U.S. state and local governments in 2008 but 25 percent of the total surplus of all 
state and local governments in 2005, both of which are far above California’s share of gdp. 
The estimated difference between California’s revenue share and gdp share in 2008 is a 
small fraction of revenue.  If California’s share of state and local government revenue in 2008 
had equaled its gdp share, revenue would have been $9 billion less (a reduction of about 2.6 
percent).  A tax reduction of $4 billion in 2008 would have reduced California’s share of state 
and local tax revenues to its gdp share.
5  Thus, in 2008 the burden on the California economy 
from taxes and fees did not differ substantially from the average for all states. 
California political leaders have complained that the state does not receive its fair share 
of federal revenues.  In 2008 California received 12 percent of total federal transfers to state and 
local governments.  This figure, while statistically significantly below California’s gdp share, is 
only slightly below the state’s share of total population, and in any case the impact of the 
shortfall below gdp share is small.  If California had received 13 percent of all federal transfers, 
rather than 12 percent, the incremental revenue would have been less than $5 billion.  Because 
federal transfers typically are tied by federal law to state spending on specific programs, 
additional revenue most likely would require an increase in expenditures.  Consequently, more 
federal revenue is not a plausible solution to the state’s budget problem. 
                                                            
5.  Because California accounts for a substantial fraction of national economic activity, the 
appropriate method for measuring the magnitude of a change in a revenue or expenditure item 
that would bring California’s share to the national average is as follows.  Let C be the California 
item in the Table, C* be the value that would arise if California’s share equaled its gdp share (in 
2008 13 percent), N be the national number after subtracting the amount for California, and s = 
C/N, so that C = s(N+C) = (.13)(N+C) + (s - .13)(N+C).  C* then arises when (s-.13) = 0, 
implying that C* = (.13)(N+C*) = (.13/.87)N = (.149)N.  For 2005, C* = (.152)N.   9
Two revenue items depart substantially from the national average:  fees and charges, and 
payments to social insurance programs.  The latter includes unemployment insurance, disability 
insurance, and pensions for state and local employees.  Because revenues from fees and social 
insurance programs are tied to benefits for those who pay, the accounting convention is to 
separate them from taxes. 
California’s revenues from fees and charges are much higher than its gdp share, but the 
primary reason is that publicly owned utilities are more common in California than elsewhere.  
For example, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power is the largest publicly owned 
electric utility in the nation and among the largest regardless of ownership, and the Sacramento 
Metropolitan Utility District ranks sixth nationally among publicly owned utilities.
6  California 
accounts for more than 20 percent of total U.S. state and local revenues from publicly owned 
electric and water utilities.  If California’s revenues from utilities owned by state and local 
government as a proportion of gdp were equal to the national average, California’s share of 
national state and local revenues in 2008 would have been 13 percent.  Thus, California was a 
“high revenue” state in 2008 only because of its unusually high degree of public ownership of 
electric and water utilities.  Because Californians would pay similar charges for utility service 
regardless of whether the supplier was public or private, utility revenue does not represent the 
same type of burden on citizens that is represented by taxes or other mandatory fees that pay for 
standard government programs. 
Reported revenues from social insurance were negative in 2008 (a loss of $550 million, 
rounded to $1 billion in Table 1).  This performance was far worse than the experiences of other 
states.  The negative revenue entry is the result of an accounting convention that counts gains 
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and losses in the value of investments by social insurance trust funds as part of revenue.  Because 
the prices of stocks and real estate tanked in fiscal 2008, states that invested large accumulated 
surpluses in pension programs showed enormous losses.  The cause of California’s negative 
revenue for social insurance programs in 2008 was a loss of $12.8 billion by pension funds (the 
difference between the decline in asset values and new contributions). 
In the boom year of 2005, when asset values were high and rising, California accounted 
for 23 percent of nationwide revenues from state and local social insurance programs, due 
primarily to a surplus in pension funds.  In 2005, California pension funds received $69 billion in 
gross revenues (compared to an expenditure of $22 billion), which was 21.9 percent of total 
national revenues for state and local pension funds.  Had California received revenue from this 
source in 2005 equal to its share of gdp, California’s revenue from all sources would have been 
$31 billion lower, causing total revenue to fall from 15.1 percent of the national total to 14.0 
percent.  The turn-around in gross revenue for pension funds between 2005 and 2008 was nearly 
$90 billion, or about 25 percent of California’s total revenue. 
The main lesson from these data is that California is not atypical on the total revenue side 
of its budget.  Although the share of state gdp that is accounted for by taxes and fees is above the 
national average, nearly all of the revenue difference is accounted for by atypically large public 
ownership of utilities and, in boom years, capital gains in public employee pension funds.  The 
revenue that is used to pay for standard functions of state and local government is not very 
different from the average among all states.  The other important feature of California’s 
government revenue is its sensitivity to the business cycle, arising from greater reliance on 
income taxes, lesser reliance on property taxes, and variation in the asset value of pension funds 
for public employees.   11
 
B.  Expenditures 
In 2008 California’s share of total spending by state and local governments, net of 
transfers between governments within the same state, was 14.6 percent, which was substantially 
above the state’s share of gdp.  Had California’s spending share equaled its gdp share, 
expenditures would have lower by $54 billion (13 percent).  Of this amount, $13 billion is 
accounted for by higher expenditures for publicly-owned utilities, leaving $41 billion of 
additional spending due to conventional government programs. 
Table 1 shows the main categories of expenditures.  The first four expenditure items are 
general categories that are not tied to specific programs:  salaries and wages of government 
employees, interest on debt, capital expenditures, and general administration.  Of these, interest 
and capital outlays are slightly above the state’s gdp share.  Spending on these items was about 
$3 billion above the state’s gdp share. 
Salaries and wages are significantly higher in California than in other states.  Had 
California’s share of salaries and wages equaled its share of gdp, expenditures would have been 
lower by roughly $13 billion (11 percent). Two factors determine the payroll budget:  the number 
of employees and the wage structure.  California does not have an atypically large number of 
state and local employees.  California accounts for 11.1 percent of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
state and local employment, which is below its population share (12.2 percent).
7  The cause of 
California’s high payroll expenditure is high pay.  Expenditures per employee in California are 
roughly 30 percent above the national average and roughly 22 percent above parity with other 
                                                            
7.  Calculated from “Government Employment and Payrolls, 2008,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009.    12
employee compensation in California.
8 
Expenditures on administration in California also exceed the national norm.  This 
category is a hodge-podge that includes financial administration, the judiciary and other legal 
functions, public buildings, elected bodies, and executive officials that cannot be allocated to 
specific programs.
9  The excess spending in this category over California’s gdp share is about $6 
billion and is due to relatively high spending on judicial, legal and general administration. 
The remaining expenditure entries in Table 1 cover the most important functional 
categories of state and local programs.  These categories are divided according to whether 
California’s share in the national total is above or below its gdp share.  California spends 
significantly less than its gdp share on elementary and secondary education, highways, and waste 
disposal.  Estimated welfare costs also are below the state’s gdp share, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Estimated expenditures on higher education are about $1 billion more 
than gdp share, but this difference also is not statistically significant.  The program areas in 
which California spending significantly exceeds gdp share are health care, public safety, parks 
and recreation, housing and community development (including redevelopment authorities), and 
social insurance.  Together the categories in which estimated expenditures exceed gdp share 
(whether significant or not) had excess expenditures over gdp share of the following amounts. 
Higher Education – $1 billion; 
Health Care (including public hospitals) – $6 billion; 
Public Safety (police, fire, corrections) – $10 billion; 
Parks and Recreation – $1 billion;  
Housing and Community Development – $4 billion; 
Social Insurance and Pensions – $12 billion (half attributable to pensions). 
                                                            
8.  This calculation is the ratio of actual compensation to hypothetical compensation if state and 
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considerable overlap with payroll cost.   13
California’s excess of expenditures over gdp share in 2005 was $31 billion.  Because $11 
billion of this total was accounted for by publicly owned utilities, $20 billion is attributable to 
programs and administration, which was less than half of the excess in 2008 for these items.  For 
higher education, California expenditures in 2005 were slightly below the state’s gdp share.  The 
excess of expenditures in the other major program areas that had excess spending in 2008 were: 
Health Care – $4 billion; 
Public Safety – $6 billion; 
Parks and Recreation – $1 billion; 
Housing and Community Development – $3 billion; 
Social Insurance – $8 billion ($3 billion due to pensions). 
 
For all of these items, California’s excess of spending over gdp share rose between 2005 
and 2008.  Whereas national expenditures by state and local governments were higher in 2008 
than in 2005, the increases in California were much greater in relation to gdp share.  Of course, 
state and local budgets for 2008 were passed in mid 2007 before the recession hit, so the 
principal explanation for the greater deterioration in California’s financial position in 2008 was 
that California’s highly pro-cyclical revenues were affected by the recession but its expenditures 
were not.  This phenomenon explains about half of the excess in California’s spending on these 
items relative to other states in 2008.  The remaining $20 billion is an excess of expenditure over 
gdp share in the items discussed above.  This spending gap would be eliminated by reducing 
total non-utility expenditures by about 5 percent. 
The lesson from these data is that while California spends a greater share of gdp on state 
and local government programs, the amount of additional spending is not large.  If the state 
decided to spend at the average rate for all state and local governments in the U.S., this goal 
could be achieved relatively easily over the next few years by some combination of modest tax 
increases and modest expenditure cuts measured against normal growth in income.  If taxes and   14
charges grew by one percent more than income and if expenditures rose by one percent less than 
income, the state’s additional spending over the national norm would disappear in three years.  
Given that California is so near the national norm and could match that norm relatively easily, 
the persistent inability of the state to pass a timely budget does not reflect financial reality. 
 
C.  Comparisons with Large States 
The preceding analysis compares California’s state and local government budgets with 
the budgets of all other states.   Another useful comparison is between California and the other 
most populous states.  The largest states are more heterogeneous than smaller states in economic 
structure, the political ideology of their citizens, and the diversity of their populations.  The 
largest states also contain large cities that are likely to cause the composition of demand for 
government services to differ from smaller states, regardless of other sources of heterogeneity. 
Table 3 compares revenues and expenditures in 2008 among the six states with the largest 
population and the highest gdp.  Each revenue and expenditure item is shown as a fraction of 
state gdp.  California has much higher revenues as a fraction of gdp than Illinois and Texas, but 
lower total revenues than the other states.  Taxes in California are substantially lower than New 
York, slightly higher than Florida, Illinois and Pennsylvania, and much higher than Texas. 
On the expenditure side, California is below New York but above all the other states.  
Again, Texas and Illinois spend substantially less than other large states, but California also 
spends 1.3 percent of gdp more than Florida and 2.5 percent of gdp more than Pennsylvania.  If 
California spent the average of these two states, its expenditures would be $28 billion less. 
Table 3 also compares the composition of expenditures by function.  The only categories 
in which California has the highest spending are higher education, social insurance, and   15
administration, although in all cases other states are close.  California also is near the top in 
salaries and wages, public safety, and utilities.  In general, the distribution of expenditures 
among programmatic categories in these states varies substantially, but California is not outside 
the range of variation. 
The greatest difference between California and other states is the allocation of revenues 
and expenditures between state and local government.  Local government expenditures in 
California are the highest among the large states, while local tax collections are lower than any 
state except Texas.  The difference between state and local tax collections is 2.6 percent of gdp 
in California, 1.8 percent in Pennsylvania, 0.9 percent in Illinois, 0.3 percent in Texas, and 
negative (meaning that local governments collect more taxes than the state) in Florida and New 
York.  The differences between taxes and expenditures of local governments as a percent of gdp 
are as follows:  California – 10.2, Florida – 8.6, Illinois – 6.5, New York – 7.4, Pennsylvania – 
6.5 and Texas – 6.0. 
The shortfall of revenues compared to expenditures by local governments is financed 
primarily by transfers from the state.  California transfers five percent of GDP from the state to 
local governments, more than any other state.  The percent of state revenue that is transferred to 
local governments is as follows:  California – 45.8, Florida – 32.6,  Illinois – 28.3, New York – 
37.5, Pennsylvania – 27.9, and Texas – 25.8.  In short, local governments in California spend the 
most money and are the most dependent on state transfers for balancing their budgets. 
The dependence of California local governments on the state is not primarily due to the 
effects of the limitation on property tax collections that were enacted in Proposition 13.  Property 
tax revenue as a fraction of gdp is lower in California than in three of the five other states, but 
the differences between California and the states with the highest property tax collections are not   16
large enough to account for the gap between revenue and expenditure among local governments 
in California.  The state with the highest property tax revenue is Florida, collecting 1.2 percent of 
gdp more than California, but the difference in state transfers between California and Florida is 
2.0 percent of gdp.  Thus, a difference between California and other states is the generosity of the 
state in supporting local expenditures. 
California’s separation of decisions about spending priorities from decisions about 
revenue generation creates perverse incentives for local officials.  From the perspective of 
citizens, the state’s financial system attenuates the relationship between the scope of local 
government services that they demand and the amount that they must pay to acquire those 
services.  Because so much of local services are paid for by the state, local officials are in a 
position to reap the benefits of expanding local services, but state officials bear the political costs 
of either raising revenues or sacrificing other programs in order to finance expanded local 
services.  The puzzle is not that local officials would seek to obtain more state money to expand 
local services, but that state officials would allow them to do so. 
               
D.  Allocation between State and Local Governments 
  Given that local governments spend so much more in California than elsewhere, the 
remaining issue is to identify the categories that account for this spending.  Table 4 contains a 
detailed breakdown of revenues and expenditures by state and local governments for California 
and the rest of the nation. 
On the revenue side, California’s share of the national revenue of state governments is 
actually less than California’s gdp share.  The state accounts for nearly one-third of national 
utility revenue, which arises from electricity sales by the state water project.  After eliminating   17
utility charges, California receives only 12.2 percent of all state government revenue.  By 
comparison, local government revenue in California is far above California’s gdp share.  Not 
counting utility charges, local governments in California receive 16.1 percent of all U.S. local 
government revenue.  This proportion would have been even higher had local government 
pension funds not experienced losses in 2008. 
While local revenue is high in California, local taxes are low.  Whereas California 
accounts for 15 percent of state government tax revenue in the U.S., local governments in 
California account for only 12.5 percent of nationwide local taxes.  Thus, California’s status as a 
state with a middling tax burden arises from combining a high-tax state government and low-tax 
local governments.  This mismatch explains the high rate at which the state transfers funds to 
local governments. 
The California state government does not spend substantially more than California’s 
share of gdp in nearly all budget categories.  Whereas California accounts for 14.2 percent of 
national spending by state governments, 38 percent of that spending is transfers to local 
governments.  For categories other than transfers, California’s expenditures are only 12.2 percent 
of total spending by states.  In addition to transfers, the only expenditure categories in which 
both the percentage and absolute amount of state spending over gdp share is substantial are 
corrections and social insurance. 
While state spending in California is below average, local government spending is higher 
than average in most categories.  The only program areas in which local governments in 
California spend less than their gdp share are elementary and secondary education, highways, 
and waste disposal.  In some cases, a high share of local spending is matched to a low share of 
state spending, reflecting greater delegation of program implementation.  Examples are higher   18
education, welfare, health care, and housing and community development.  Finally, in a few 
categories both the state and local governments spend more than their gdp share, notably public 
safety, utilities, social insurance (especially pensions), and administration. 
Whereas California’s low spending on elementary and secondary education receives 
considerable publicity, three other unusual budget items are not as widely recognized.  The first 
is the relatively low spending by the state and high spending by local government on higher 
education.  This spending pattern is accounted for by California’s atypical reliance on 
community colleges, which are operated by local special districts.  The other two are California’s 
low expenditures on highways and waste disposal.  California’s low spending on these 
infrastructure categories is surprising, given the state’s reliance on motor vehicle transportation 
and stringent environmental laws. 
While some local programs are controlled by the state through delegation of operating 
responsibility combined with tied transfers of state funds, other items are largely controlled by 
local governments.  Examples of the latter are public hospitals, public safety, parks and 
recreation, and community redevelopment.  Because total state and local expenditures on state-
controlled items (notably public education and highways) generally are not dramatically higher 
than California’s gdp share, high spending in categories controlled by local governments is the 
primary cause of the excess of total spending over the national norm. 
An important source of high local expenditures is high compensation of local employees.  
While state employees are highly paid, in 2008 the state employed only 9 percent of all state 
employees in the U.S. and its payroll for state employees was only 12.1 percent of total U.S. 
state payrolls.  These employees are relatively productive in that California’s share of state 
spending exceeds its share of state payrolls.  In the U.S. 13.3 percent of state expenditures are   19
accounted for by salaries and wages, whereas the proportion in California is only 11.3 percent.  
California local governments account for 11.8 percent of all local government employment 
(bellow the population share), but 15.2 percent of the national payroll for local employees.  As 
discussed in the article by Professor Kiewiet, California public employees also have substantially 
higher pensions.  Because local governments have roughly 3.5 times as many employees as the 
state government, the most important single source of higher state and local expenditures in 
California is the high total compensation of local government employees. 
Whereas the combined state and local government budgets in California showed a deficit 
in 2008, the state accounted for most of the shortfall.  For the state, spending exceeded revenue 
by $46 billion, while local government spending exceeded revenue by $13 billion.  Most of the 
state’s revenue shortfall was accounted for by the deficit in the pension funds, which spent $21 
billion and had negative revenues (due to the fall in the value of trust funds) of $11 billion (a net 
loss of nearly $32 billion).  Local governments spent $8 billion on pensions and lost another $2 
billion in the net value of trust funds.  Thus, on operations other than pensions, the state had a 
deficit of $14 billion while local governments had a deficit of $3 billion. 
In the better economic environment of 2005, the state’s fiscal condition was healthier.  
State revenues exceeded expenditures by $40 billion, although nearly all of this amount – $38 
billion – was accounted for by a surplus in state pension funds, leaving the remainder of the state 
budget roughly in balance.  Local governments in California technically showed a surplus of $3 
billion in 2005, but the excess of revenues over expenditures for pension funds was $9 billion, 
implying a deficit in the remainder of local budgets of $6 billion. 
The deficit in the state budget is much smaller than state transfers to local governments.  
For example, the state had a deficit in 2008 (excluding pension funds) of $14 billion, but net   20
transfers to local governments were $93 billion.  One should not be surprised that in a budget 
crisis the state seeks to cut transfers to local governments.  With transfers equal to 38 percent of 
expenditures, the state could not plausibly balance its budget without cutting local transfers. 
 
III.   Explaining the Unique Pattern of California’s Structural Deficit 
The preceding section identifies how state and local budgets differ between California 
and other states:  high centralization of revenue compared to expenditures.  Conventional 
wisdom places the blame for this imbalance on Prop 13, which limited local government’s 
capacity to raise revenue.  The puzzle is why the state accepts the political liability of higher 
taxes to provide funds that allow local officials to reap the political rewards of greater spending. 
Because this pattern of revenue and expenditure is unique to California, the explanation 
must come from something unusual about Californians or their government.  One possibility is 
that the circumstances and diversity of California’ population creates distinctive preferences 
regarding government programs, the allocation of policy responsibility among types of 
governments, or methods for raising revenue.  The other possibility is that California has unique 
institutions that cause its public finances to differ from other states in a manner that distorts the 
combined budget of state and local governments.  This section shows that political institutions 
are the primary cause of California’s unusual allocation of revenues and expenditures. 
 
A.  Theoretical Background:  Soft Budget Constraints 
In analyzing the details of how California’s political environment affects state and local 
government budgets, a useful starting place is the political economic theory of intergovernmental 
fiscal relationships.  California political institutions establish the regional (state) and local   21
components of the larger federal system in which Californians live.  Federalism is a system of 
government in which subordinate levels of government have some autonomy to determine the 
level and composition of public services for their residents.  Fiscal federalism refers to a system 
in which higher levels of government transfers revenue to lower levels to assist the latter in 
providing decentralized government services. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, economists developed “first generation fiscal federalism,” which 
identified how national economic welfare could be improved if a higher level of government 
financed certain local government functions.
10  Decentralization of the provision of public 
services is potentially beneficial if citizens in different localities differ in their tastes for 
government services and if local governments possess better information about the preferences 
of their citizens than do higher levels of government.  But even if these conditions are present, 
decentralization of both taxation and expenditure decisions may not maximize economic welfare 
for four reasons.  First, some locally provided government goods plausibly affect the welfare of 
citizens in other jurisdictions, in which case autonomous local governments will provide 
inefficient amounts of the service – too little if the service benefits other communities (e.g., 
arterial roads) or too much if a local service harms other communities (e.g., a waste disposal 
facility at a community boundary).  Second, the amount of local services that will be provided by 
an autonomous local government depends on the wealth of its residents, so that a higher level 
government may seek to impose floors on the level of services to achieve equity objectives.  
Third, the costs (including economic distortions) of taxation may differ among types of taxes and 
the level of government at which the tax is imposed, so that the optimal taxation system for 
                                                            
10.  For a summary of first-generation and second-generation theories of fiscal federalism, see 
Wallace Oates, “Towards a Second Generation Fiscal Federalism,” International Tax and Public 
Finance 12(4) (January 2005), pp. 349-73.    22
balancing the combined budgets of all governments may lead to differences between taxes and 
expenditures at each level of government.  Fourth, only the national government can implement 
effective macroeconomic policy, and the center may seek to stimulate demand by paying for 
increased local spending.  An example is the current U.S. stimulus program that provides 
revenue to local governments to enable them to avoid layoffs of teachers, police and fire fighters. 
Several important assumptions underpin first-generation fiscal federalism, two of which 
are important for understanding the California budget problem.  The first is that elected officials 
at all levels of government seek to maximize national economic welfare, and the second is that 
government officials possess sufficient information about the value of government services to 
different communities to design the optimal decentralization of services, taxation, and method 
for transferring revenues between levels of government.  “Second-generation fiscal federalism” 
is based on more realistic assumptions about the effect of democratic elections on the goals of 
elected officials and the extent to which these officials and the citizens who elect them have good 
information about the effects of taxes and expenditures on economic welfare. 
The origin of second-generation fiscal federalism is the theory of the “soft budget 
constraint” that arose from the experiences of Hungary in attempting to democratize and 
decentralize government and the economy in the 1980s.
11  While this theory originally was 
developed to explain why breaking up state-owned enterprises into competing, autonomous units 
did not substantially improve their efficiency, the theory soon was expanded to fiscal 
relationships between governments in a federal system.
12 
                                                            
11.  Janos Kornai, “The Soft Budget Constraint,” Kyklos 39(1) (February 1986), pp. 3-30. 
12.  For a survey of the expanded application of the idea of a soft budget constraint, see Janos 
Kornai, Eric Maskin and Gerard Roland, “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 41(4) (December 2003), pp. 1095-1136.   23
The idea behind the soft budget constraint is that if local officials believe that officials at 
higher levels of government will respond to a local budget crisis by providing additional funds, 
then the amount of local spending will be excessive.  The reason is that greater transfers enable 
local officials to increase the amount of services that they deliver to their constituents without 
proportionately increasing the taxes that their constituents must pay.  This problem is 
exacerbated if the information that is available to citizens and government officials about the 
effects of programs, taxation methods, and the connection between revenues and programs is 
imperfect.  When information is incomplete, accountability for the performance of the public 
sector is undermined, creating a trade-off between the welfare benefits of decentralization and 
the tendency of decentralization to cause local governments to spend too much.
13 
Whether fiscal federalism causes local governments to be too large depends on the details 
of how revenue and expenditure decisions, including transfers to local governments, are made.
14  
Transfers from higher to lower level governments do not necessarily lead to soft budget 
constraints, and an important lesson from second-generation theory is that a federal system in 
which local governments have considerable autonomy and face hard budget constraints 
facilitates the development of a robust market economy.
15  The key to whether fiscal federalism 
enhances or reduces economic welfare is the design of federal system, including the fiscal 
relationships among governments, which typically (as in California) are determined by 
constitutional provisions that are difficult to change. 
                                                            
13.  David E. Wildasin, “Externalities and Bailouts:  Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 1843, August 1997.   
14.  Barry R. Weingast, “Second-Generation Fiscal Federalism:  The Implications of Fiscal 
Incentives,” Journal of Urban Economics 65(3) (May 2009), pp. 279-93. 
15.  Barry R. Weingast, “The Economic Role of Political Institutions:  Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11(1) 
(1995), pp. 1-31.   24
The implications of fiscal federalism for California’s budget problems reside in the 
details of California’s political environment.  Sufficient conditions for fiscal federalism to have 
potential efficiency benefits are local differences in the demand for public services and in the 
ability to pay for services that, for equity reasons, society wishes to provide more equally than 
would be the case if these services were financed solely from local revenues.  But the potential 
for increased welfare from decentralization will not be realized if the fiscal relationships between 
the state and local governments create incentives for elected officials that distort the level and 
composition of government services.  The remainder of this section examines state and local 
fiscal relationships in light of these insights. 
 
B.  Population Heterogeneity 
One factor that affects the desirability of decentralization of public services and that is 
likely to influence California’s intergovernmental fiscal relationships is the heterogeneity of the 
population.  Providing local services through a large network of cities, counties and special 
governments (California has the most special governments of any state in the U.S.) may serve a 
diverse state better even if it creates coordination problems and drives up total spending.
16  
Because California’s population is diverse, local government jurisdictions vary in economic 
structure, the wealth of residents, ethnic composition and fraction of foreign born residents, and 
the political ideology of the median voter.  These sources of heterogeneity cause differences in 
the level and composition of demand for public services.  By delegating more policy authority to 
local government, the state allows the composition of public services to respond to heterogeneity 
                                                            
16.  A recent study finds that local spending goes up with the number of separate overlapping 
local jurisdictions. See Christopher Berry, “Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal 
Common-Pool,” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 52, number 4, pp. 802-820.   25
in demand.  Citizen heterogeneity implies that voter satisfaction can be greater if local 
governments choose the amount and composition of public services that their residents receive. 
While citizen heterogeneity helps to explain some aspects of California’s public finance 
system – especially the highly fractionalized way local services are delivered – it is not a 
complete explanation of the state’s distinctive fiscal arrangements.  California’s racial and ethnic 
diversity is significantly higher than the rest of the country (47% non-Hispanic white versus 65% 
on average in the US), but not higher than other large states.  Moreover, aside from the need for 
language assistance, race and ethnicity does not translate as closely into a differentiated demand 
for local government services as does socio-economic diversity.  Californians have slightly 
higher incomes than the average for the U.S., but California is not the wealthiest state, and the 
percent living below the poverty line is pretty much the national norm (13%).   In other words, 
Californians are socio-economically diverse, but not more so than citizens of the other most 
populous states.  There is no basis for concluding that upstate versus downstate New York, Cook 
County versus the rest of Illinois, southern Florida versus the rest of the state, and eastern versus 
western Pennsylvania exhibit less diversity in their expectations for government services than 
California does.  Moreover, population diversity provides us with no explanation for why the 
state continues to transfer revenues to local governments to provide these services.  For this, we 
must turn to the history and structure of California’s governance institutions. 
 
C.  Institutions:  The Legislature 
Several unusual institutional features of California apply to the legislature, making it 
especially prone to special interest influence, heavy discounting of future fiscal problems, and 
excessive partisanship and gridlock.  In politics, size matters.  California is the most populous   26
state, but the California legislature, with 120 members, ranks 35
th in size.  Among other populous 
states, Florida has 160 state legislators, Illinois has 177, Texas has 181, New York has 212, and 
Pennsylvania has 253.
17  California state Senate districts contain over 900,000 people and state 
Assembly districts contain over 450,000.  Legislative districts in other populous states are much 
smaller.  The ratio of the population to the number of state legislators in the six largest states is 
approximately as follows: 
 California  300,000 
 Florida   115,000 
 Illinois       75,000 
  New York    90,000 
  Pennsylvania    50,000 
 Texas   135,000 
A smaller legislature with larger districts implies more heterogeneous constituencies, a 
smaller proportion of voters who know their legislator, and hence less citizen satisfaction with 
their representatives.  Moreover, larger districts make personal campaigning more difficult even 
for candidates who are widely known.  As a result, campaign finance is a more important 
determinant of electoral success in larger districts, enhancing the influence of campaign 
contributors and, hence, organized interests such as large corporations, unions, and single-issue 
citizen groups.  Many California public sector groups have thrived in this situation, including 
teachers, nurses, police officers, prison guards, and fire fighters. The money and endorsements of 
these groups are especially important to state legislators and local elected officials.  In addition, 
the effect of shifting more of the burden of local government funding to the state has been to 
push more local interest group efforts out of the nonpartisan confines of local government into 
the partisan state-wide arena where the politics are both more bitter and more expensive. 
                                                            
17.  All information about state legislatures is from the web site of the National Conference of 
State Legislators.   27
Another feature of the legislature that has affected the budget process is legislative term 
limits.  In 1992, California was among the first three states to adopt term limits for legislators 
and its limits are among the most stringent in the nation.  Although 15 states have legislative 
term limits, California’s limits – 6 years in the Assembly and 8 years in the Senate – are tied with 
Arkansas and Michigan for the shortest.  California also is one of only six states to impose a 
lifetime ban on term-limited legislators.  None of the other five largest states has term limits;  the 
largest states with term limits are Michigan and Ohio, and only Michigan imposes a lifetime ban. 
California’s term limits imply that at least 10 senators and 27 assembly members (about 
30 percent of the state legislature) will not run for re-election in each election cycle.  Because 
term limits cause legislators to be on the lookout for the next job as soon as they are elected, 
some run for another office or accept another position (including local government positions) 
before their terms expire, causing the turnover after each election sometimes to be even higher.  
Rapid turnover also creates an incentive to please local governments, which may provide the 
next job opportunity for a legislator.  Term limits constrain the ability of a legislator to develop 
either expertise in a policy area or a record of accomplishment on which to base future 
campaigns, and also increases the importance of campaign financing and the dependence of 
legislators on interest groups. 
California’s relatively drastic term limits contribute to the budget problem by reducing 
accountability for the long-term effects of legislative actions.  The state’s cyclically sensitive 
revenues expand rapidly in booms, creating an opportunity for higher spending or lower taxation 
that is not sustainable when the boom comes to an end.  Term limited legislators who vote for 
expansion of programs or tax cuts in a boom are mostly no longer in the legislature when the 
boom ends and a deficit looms.  The ensuing political costs of spending cuts or tax increases are   28
suffered by a different set of legislators than those who created the problem. 
Two other features of California’s system of legislative elections may have contributed to 
California’s budget problems by making it harder to achieve bipartisan agreement:  the semi-
closed primary system and bipartisan redistricting by the legislature.  Together these institutions 
all but eliminated marginal districts and weakened the moderating effect that competitive 
elections might have on hard line budget positions.  Reform groups hope that the recent adoption 
of the top-two nomination system and a non-partisan redistricting process will increase the 
likelihood of bi-partisan compromises and reduce the frequency of partisan gridlock. 
In a semi-closed primary system, each political party nominates a single candidate to run 
in the general election, and only members of that political party and unaffiliated voters are 
allowed to vote to select the party’s candidate.  Because registered partisans tend to be more 
ideologically extreme and unaffiliated voters tend to be less inclined to vote in a partisan 
primary, the primaries exerted a centrifugal force on candidate positions.  In a top-two 
nomination system, all candidates appear on a single ballot, but only the two candidates with the 
most votes then run in the general election.  The hope of advocates of top-two primaries is that 
voters in safe seats will get to choose between a moderate and a more ideologically pure 
candidate from the dominant party in the final round, and that unaffiliated voters plus voters 
from the other party will join forces with moderate voters of the dominant party to elect more 
centrist candidates.  Whether this will happen in enough instances to significantly change the 
composition of the legislature and whether moderate Democrats and Republicans would 
nonetheless toe the party line on taxes and the budget are as yet unanswered questions. 
Similarly, the reform community hopes that a politically balanced but impartially chosen 
citizen commission will be less likely to draw safe seats for incumbents.  The so-called Prop 11   29
commission almost certainly will draw district lines to put more seats in the competitive range 
than the legislature did last time, and as one study has shown, that should result in at least 1/5
th of 
the seats being potentially competitive.
18  But whether this effect translates into a large enough 
group of centrist legislators to force a compromise on fiscal matters is open to question, given 
that the Republicans first initiated and enforced party line discipline on their members in the late 
nineties when the elections were held under district lines that were drawn by the court. 
The strongest case for the moderating effect of these reforms is that together they will 
create a centrist caucus that is sufficiently large to exert an influence on budget negotiations 
similar to the impact that blue dogs and centrist U.S. Senators had on the health care reforms at 
the national level.  But the health care example also reminds us that the compromises that arise 
from empowering moderates can produce an outcome that causes dissatisfaction from the entire 
political spectrum. 
Moderating the legislature through better electoral engineering, if that is the primary goal, 
would work best if California retained its two-thirds legislative vote requirement for passing a 
budget or changing a tax.  By itself, empowering the minority does not necessarily lead to 
partisan gridlock on the budget if the parties both contain centrists willing to break from party 
orthodoxy.  Gridlock arises from the conjunction of polarized, unyielding caucuses with the two-
thirds budget and tax vote requirement.  If the nomination and redistricting reforms work as they 
are intended and create a large enough bloc of centrist legislators, the leverage of the moderates 
would be likely to be greater with supermajority than simple majority budget and tax rules. 
                                                            
18.  Except for extremely non-compact and likely unconstitutional redistricting schemes, it 
appears that based on a line-drawing simulation exercise, 20% is the normal expectation for seats 
that are within a historically determined competitive range.  See Bruce E. Cain, Iris Hui and 
Karin MacDonald, “Sorting or Self-Sorting: Competition and Redistricting in California,” in The 
New Political Geography of California, edited by Frederick Douzet, Ken Miller and Thad 
Kousser, Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2008.   30
Consider, for example, how centrists in the U.S. Senate use the filibuster rule.  If 
California voters impose a simple majority budget rule, the majority party will not have to win 
any votes from the minority party or even from its own moderates to obtain passage of the 
budget, possibly neutralizing the impact of the reforms of the nomination and redistricting 
systems.   Super-majority rules are meant to induce moderation by requiring compromise with 
some number of the other party’s caucus, and after the annual ritual of summer gridlock, this is 
typically what happens in California. The fact some reform groups have simultaneously pushed 
for reforms intended to enhance the electoral chances of moderates but also support the simple 
majority budget votes is a curious logical inconsistency, most likely for the sake of keeping 
together a bipartisan coalition.  Californians have to make a decision:  do they want cross-party 
compromises even when one party controls both the legislative and executive branches, or do 
they want simple majority rule with clearer electoral accountability? 
Another moderating effect on budget negotiations is split control of government. The fact 
that the Governor’s office and one or both houses of the legislature can be held by different 
parties can create a powerful incentive for budgetary compromise.  Curiously, a consequence of 
the two-thirds majority budget vote requirement is that it undercuts the authority of the governor 
by reducing the power of the veto.  Once the legislature has adopted a budget with a two-thirds 
vote, a veto by the governor is likely to be over-ridden.  In a similar fashion, if the governor’s 
party does not control the legislature, a veto override requires a two-thirds vote and so has a 
similar effect to imposing a two-thirds requirement for the original bill. 
The important difference between an original two-thirds vote requirement and the 
prospect of a veto is that the governor may have different budget priorities than the members of 
the governor’s party in the legislature.  Because governors are elected from a state-wide   31
constituency, they are more likely than legislators to be near the ideological center, and hence 
more likely than the legislative leadership of the governor’s party to be able to reach a 
compromise with legislators of the opposite party.  Thus, indirectly institutions that weaken the 
governor can increase the frequency of partisan gridlock 
These various legislative problems contribute to California’s fiscal problems, but do they 
account for the state’s unique dysfunction (i.e. the misalignment state and local fiscal 
incentives)?  The rise in partisanship, after all, is a national phenomenon.  The severity of the 
state’s term limits and the extent of its supermajority rules are less common but not unique.  
Together, however, they contribute to legislative failure (e.g. inability to sign budgets on time, 
tendency to ignore structural deficits until they lead to crisis, etc.), which in turn leads to 
initiative attempts to fix the problem, many of which only make the situation worse.  Divided 
government and supermajority rules for legislative constitutional amendments mean that unless 
the two major parties agree on a fundamental change, it will die somewhere along the line to 
passage.  As pointed out in our earlier book, Constitutional Reform in California, the fact that 
constitutional change requires only a majority of those voting on an initiative but 2/3 of the 
legislature locks in key features of the fiscal status quo unless and until a well-funded interest 
group sponsors an initiative that gives the statewide electorate the chance to change the system. 
So why does the legislature consent to fund local government through state taxes?  Local 
services are popular with voters of both parties, in part because decentralization of the budget 
allows local governments to adjust spending to local conditions.  Moreover, endorsements by 
certain public sector employees (e.g. police and fire) are available to both parties and are 
electorally significant.  Term limits, by causing legislators always to be looking for their next 
job, increases the responsiveness of legislators to requests from potential political rivals who   32
hold positions in local government.  But these features cannot be the cause of high transfers to 
local government and the loss of fiscal discipline that these transfers create because they are not 
unique to California.  An additional source of the problem is the constraints imposed on both 
state and local governments by ballot measures that have reduced the flexibility of state-local 
fiscal arrangements and the accountability of legislative officials for the distortion in 
expenditures and revenue sources.  In particular, the legislature cannot adopt a system of 
transferring revenue to local government that is based in part on local tax effort because doing so 
is unrealistic if local governments face institutional constraints that prevent them from adopting 
an appropriate system of local taxation.  Thus, the existing system in which local governments 
are heavily subsidized by the state exists primarily because the neither the state nor local 
governments have sufficient authority to fix the problem. 
 
D.  Institutions:  Fragmented Executive 
A highly fragmented executive branch is another unique feature of California’s 
governance institutions.  An illustration of executive fragmentation is the governance of 
education, by far the largest state and local program area.  Management of state education is 
divided among an independently elected Superintendent of Public Instruction, who heads the 
Department of Education;  the Secretary of Education, who holds the education portfolio in the 
governor’s cabinet;  and the State Board of Education, the voting members of which are 
appointed by the governor.  The Superintendent serves as the non-voting secretary of the Board.  
The Secretary of Education, while periodically invited to make a presentation to the Board, has 
no formal relationship with either the Department or the Board. 
Similar fragmentation is present in financial management, which is diffused among an   33
independently elected Treasurer, an independently elected Controller, an independently elected 
Board of Equalization, and the Director of Finance (appointed by the governor), who heads the 
Department of Finance.  The Controller, the Chair of the Board of Equalization, and the Director 
of Finance also constitute the Franchise Tax Board. 
.  Fragmentation of the executive branch has the effect of reducing accountability for the 
performance of state government.  Fragmentation can affect the budget because it interferes with 
the ability of the governor to manage all aspects of the budget and to make trade-offs among 
programs that are controlled by other executive officials.  By weakening the authority of the 
governor, fragmentation enhances the authority of the legislature, which in turn increases the 
likelihood of partisan gridlock due to the tendency of governors to be more centrist than the 
legislative leaders of their party. 
 
E.  The Initiative Process 
California has a relatively user-friendly and highly professionalized process for 
qualifying initiatives for the ballot that allows voters to adopt fiscal constitutional amendments 
through an initiative that requires only simply majority approval.  Consequently, California has 
enshrined many fiscal policy decisions into its state constitution.  In addition, even statutory 
initiatives cannot be amended by the legislature without voter approval.  At the same time, 
various initiative measures constrain local sources of revenues and limit the legislature’s ability 
to divert funds from local services for other purposes.  Partisanship and supermajority rules for 
legislative constitutional amendments prevent the majority party from imposing its solution, 
leaving structural problems to fester.  As documented in the companion article by Isabel 
Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Joseph Wallis, highly visible dysfunction of the legislature stokes   34
more initiatives that impose further constraints, leading to a continuing downward cycle of 
legislative failure and initiative reaction. 
Ballot measures created the rules and constraints that have contributed to the state’s 
budget gridlock.  Proposition 13 and other tax limitation measures not only cut or limited taxes 
and enacted higher vote thresholds for increasing taxation, but also created a highly pro-cyclical 
revenue system that is centralized in the state.  The cumulative effect of initiatives over the last 
half-century has been to reduce local sources of revenue, to increase spending (a major recent 
example is the 2008 measure that authorized a $43 billion high-speed rail system), and to reduce 
the flexibility of elected officials in balancing the budget, thereby exacerbating the consequences 
of the 2/3 vote requirement.  Consequently, many analysts identify the initiative as the root cause 
of the budget problem.  Yet the initiative process that created the budget problem is popular with 
voters, and rarely have voters approved repeal of a previously adopted measure. 
Three key features of the initiative are especially problematic. 
First, the initiative creates ossification of the budget.  The state constitution permits a 
simple majority of voters to impose a super-majority requirement on legislators to raise taxes or 
to cut expenditures.  Consequently, a temporary electoral majority – perhaps responding to an 
unusual circumstance – can, in effect, impose a long-term solution to a short-term problem, 
binding the hands of future majorities to undo prior actions that prove to be counter-productive.   
A legislative amendment to undo a constitutional fiscal measure requires a supermajority vote 
and some measure of bipartisanship to qualify for the ballot.  An initiative can also be overturned 
by a subsequent popular initiative, but the opacity of both the budget and the budget process 
combined with a generic mistrust of the legislature works against such a measure.  Moreover, 
qualifying a new measure requires sufficient financial support from interest groups to make   35
successful reversal of a prior initiative feasible. 
Second, the initiative process encourages “feel good” measures that are fiscally 
irresponsible.  The initiative process permits ballot measures that cut taxes without specifying 
which expenditures will be cut to accommodate the fall in revenues, or that increase expenditures 
without specifying how these expenditures will be financed.  Whereas most voters like tax cuts, a 
minority of voters support spending cuts in each major program area.  The willingness of voters 
to approve cuts and caps on taxes along with measures that increase expenditures has made 
balancing the state budget increasingly difficult. 
Third, the initiative centralizes policy at the state level.  The initiative process allows a 
statewide majority to impose rules on local communities about their fiscal process, undermining 
local choice and sovereignty.  Allowing a statewide majority to impose rules on state fiscal 
processes makes sense, although whether that should be done by a simple majority vote is 
questionable.  But allowing the state’s electorate to dictate rules for local communities limits the 
freedom of communities to meet the varying demands for local public services that are sure to be 
present in a diverse state.  Needless to say, concentration of policy making at the state level also 
causes a misalignment of state revenue and local expenditures because statewide restrictions 
limit the ability and incentive to find local revenue even when the demand for local services is 
robust.  Lobbying the legislature for state funds or exploiting state pension systems to reward 
local employees is politically easier than trying to get supermajority support for tax increases 
from voters.  But there is more to the story than political convenience. 
The initiative is available at all levels of government, but groups that sponsor initiatives 
have a powerful incentive to introduce measures at the state level.  First, because local 
governments are subordinate to the state, a state law can constrain all local governments, even   36
those whose citizens would not support that law at the local level.  Fighting an initiative battle at 
the state level, therefore, is likely to be both less expensive and more likely to succeed than 
fighting the same battle separately in numerous local jurisdictions.  Thus, even measures that are 
aimed at constraining local government, such as the property tax limit in Proposition 13, are 
likely to be proposed as state measures. 
The effect of an easy initiative that encourages the use of state measures to constrain 
local policy decisions has been to impose greater limits on local taxation than on the state.  At 
the same time, the principal effect of the initiative on expenditures has focused on state 
programs, leaving local governments more flexibility than the state in allocating budgets among 
program areas.  In a polarized state political environment, decentralization of a great deal of 
expenditure authority is a means of creating partisan compromise.  Whereas state legislators may 
vehemently dislike the policy preferences of members of the other party in the state legislature, 
each is likely to favor the policies that are adopted by local governments in their constituencies.  
That is, state legislators are unlikely to favor seriously undermining the financial condition of the 
local governments in their constituencies because doing so will make them less popular at home 
and more vulnerable to same-party challengers for their seats, the primary source of which is city 
councils and county commissions.  Consequently, under a two-thirds vote rule for the budget in 
the state legislature, the majority party is likely to be forced to make more concessions on 
programs that are controlled by the state than on overall budget support for local governments. 
The implication of this analysis is that the proximate cause of California’s budget 
problem is legislative dysfunction (i.e. polarization, short term-limited time horizons, powerful 
interest groups that donate large sums of money, etc.) that arises from the incentives that have 
been created by governance institutions, as discussed above.  The ultimate cause, however, is the   37
initiative, which is the source of both perverse governance institutions and unworkable 
constraints on the state budget.  The only way this problem can be solved is be rewriting the state 
constitution, either from scratch (a constitutional convention or a revision commission) or 
through a long series of initiatives that amend the constitution provision by provision. 
The more likely reform is a sequence of further initiatives, as the prospects for a 
successful constitutional convention or revision commission are remote at best.  The gridlock 
that the initiative process has helped to create also prevents the legislature from undertaking 
fundamental reform, as illustrated by the death in the state legislature of all of the proposals from 
the Constitution Revision Commission.  Many initiatives have been proposed to deal with the 
budget problem or to reform California’s governance in ways that would have important 
budgetary impacts, but they are often logically inconsistent and fail to address fundamental 
problems.  The challenge is to forge a coherent fiscal system that addresses core problems like 
the misalignment of revenue and expenditures though a series of separate initiative measures.  
The next section reviews some of the current efforts at reform by initiative measures, and the last 
section offers some final thoughts about what needs to be addressed but has not been so far. 
 
IV.  Pending Reform Proposals 
In recent years, some political leaders, citizens’ organizations and interest groups have 
taken to the ballot attempting to reform California’s political institutions in ways that could 
affect state and local budgets.  Prominent examples are the unsuccessful measures that were 
sponsored by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2005 and 2008, the successful 2008 Prop 11 
initiative creating  a citizens’ redistricting commission for redrawing the boundaries of state 
legislative districts in response to the 2010 Census, and the successful 2010 Prop 22 initiative    38
instituting the top-two primary system.  
Several initiatives that have qualified for the November 2010 ballot have potentially 
important budget implications.
19  They fall into three categories:  proposals to fix the budget 
problem by focusing on revenue and expenditures (Props 19, 21 and 24), proposals that seek to 
reform the budget process (Props 22, 25 and 26), and proposals that might affect the budget 
negotiations by altering the political process (Prop 27).  Emanating from different groups with 
varying agendas, they illustrate the problem of reform by separate initiatives and the allure of a 
more coherent, synthetic approach such as a constitutional convention or revision commission. 
While the intentions in most instances are sincere, the passage of some carries the risk of 
exacerbating rather than improving California’s fiscal problem. 
 
A.  Measures that Focus on Revenues and Expenditures 
Proposition 19:   Legalize and tax marijuana, thereby potentially increasing state and 
local tax revenues while decreasing expenditures on incarcerating people for marijuana 
possession, use and sale.  The sponsor of the initiative estimates that Californians spend $15 
billion annually on illegal marijuana and estimates that state and local governments could 
increase tax revenues by “billions of dollars” if the measure were adopted, although the actual 
budget impact if the measure passes is highly uncertain.
20  The measure does not set a tax on 
marijuana, but it authorizes local governments to do so.  The measure does not change existing 
                                                            
19.  Initiatives and referenda that have qualified for the ballot or that are in the process of 
qualification are listed on http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_1.htm. 
20.  If marijuana were subject to the state sales tax and the legalization of marijuana had no 
effect on the dollar magnitude of marijuana purchases, total state and local revenues would 
increase by a bit more than $1 billion.  Most likely, legalization would lower the price and 
increase the quantity sold, with an unclear net effect on sales tax revenue.  For legalization to 
create “billions of dollars” or new revenues, most likely state and local governments would have 
to tax marijuana at a higher rate than the states sales tax rate.   39
vote requirements for adopting a new tax, so that a state marijuana tax in excess of the state sales 
tax would require a two-thirds vote by the legislature, and a higher local tax would require local 
voter approval.  The revenue effect of this measure also hinges on whether the federal 
government will tolerate an open market for a product that is illegal by federal law.  Even if the 
federal government does not allow an open marijuana market, this measure may succeed in 
shifting the cost of enforcing the prohibition against marijuana production and use to the federal 
government.  In this case, the costs of police, the legal system, and prisons will be lower, 
although the effect is likely to be small. 
Proposition 21:  Increase the vehicle license fee by $18, generating approximately $500 
million in revenue to be used exclusively for state parks and programs to protect wildlife and 
natural resources.  Unlike most ballot propositions that mandate increased spending, this measure 
would generate revenue to pay for the proposed expenditure and so would not make the budget 
problem more severe.  Nevertheless, this measure would slightly reduce the flexibility of the 
state legislature by earmarking the increase in the vehicle license fee.  State spending on parks 
and recreation is below the national average as a share of gdp, and this measure would eliminate 
the gap;  however, because local governments spend much more than the national average in this 
category, the measure would cause California’s overall share of spending on parks and 
recreations to rise to 16.5 percent. 
Proposition 24:  Change the methods of calculating corporate tax liability in a manner 
that would increase corporate tax liability by approximately $1.7 billion.  In 2008, California 
collected $11.8 billion from the corporate income tax, so this measure represents an increase of 
about 15 percent.  The projected revenue increase is too small to have much of an effect on the 
perennial state budget crisis.  Because corporations can avoid this tax increase by relocating   40
corporate headquarters out of the state, the revenue from the measure could be substantially less 
than the estimate.  The measure could even cause a decline in total revenue if some large 
companies relocated.  In general, this measure continues the trend in California of shifting the 
tax burden to the state. 
 
B.  Measures to Change the Budget Process  
Proposition 22:  Prohibit the state from transferring revenues from local governments 
that support certain local services, community redevelopment projects, and transportation 
programs.  This measure would cause local revenues to be higher (and net state revenues after 
local transfers to be lower) by several billion dollars in periods of unusually low tax revenue, 
such as the present.  This measure exacerbates the principal source of the state’s budget problem, 
which is unusually high spending by local government combined with unusually high transfers 
of revenues from the state.  Proposition 1A, passed in 2004, allowed the state to borrow revenues 
from funds that were earmarked for specific uses, but only temporarily.  In addition, in some 
cases the state legislature, by a two-thirds vote, can cut expenditures that are mandated by ballot 
measures.  This initiative eliminates these possibilities, thereby causing state programs to bear a 
greater portion of the burden of a reduction in state government revenue during a recession.  By 
reducing the flexibility of the state’s response to lower revenues, this measure would lead to 
more severe budget crises during economic downturns, and would increase the likelihood that 
the legislature would be forced to increase state taxes and fees to produce a budget.  The measure 
also would further attenuate the relationship between local government expenditures and 
taxation, thereby reducing the accountability of government officials for the budget problem.  In 
short, this measure will make the state’s recurring budget problem worse.   41
Proposition 25:  Eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement in the state legislature for 
passing the annual budget, but retain the two-third requirement for changes in taxes.  This 
measure would enable the majority party in the legislature to pass a budget, but would not 
necessarily solve the problem of delayed budgets if the governor was a member of another party 
and vetoed the budget.  Moreover, because the two-thirds vote is retained for taxes, the likely 
response of the state will be to increase the share of revenue that is accounted for by fees and 
charges.  Examples are higher tuition at state universities and greater reliance on tolls to finance 
highways.  Because the measure allows the budget but not tax increases to be passed by a 
majority vote, it could exacerbate the tendency to expand programs beyond the capacity of the 
state to finance them, especially during the boom phase of the business cycle. 
Proposition 26:  Impose a two-thirds vote requirement for the legislature to change fees 
imposed by the state other than taxes, and require voter approval of changes in fees by local 
governments.  This measure would increase the difficulty of using increases in state fees and 
charges to balance the budget.  If Proposition 25 passes, ending the two-thirds vote requirement 
to pass a budget bill, this measure would prevent the shift in revenue enhancements from taxes to 
fees and increase the likelihood that a projected deficit will be closed by cutting expenditures.  In 
addition, by imposing a referendum requirement on local governments to increase fees, this 
measure would increase the dependence of local governments on state transfers, thereby further 
attenuating the relationship between revenues and expenditures by local governments. 
 
C.  Measures that Affect the Budget by Changing the Political Process 
Proposition 27:  Repeals the 2008 initiative that created the citizens’ commission to draw 
the boundaries of state legislative districts.  Because the new Citizens Redistricting Commission   42
will redraw districts only after data from the 2010 census are available, no elections have 
occurred under the new system, so no evidence exists about whether the method of drawing 
districts matters.  A non-partisan method for drawing district boundaries may reduce partisan 
gridlock by creating more districts that are not securely held by one party, which would have a 
beneficial effect on the ability of the legislature to pass a timely budget.  Experience with 
redistricting commissions in others states, including Arizona (the closest analog to the California 
Commission), indicates that the method of defining legislative districts does not have much of an 
effect.  The balanced partisan composition of commissions and their tendency to try to draw 
districts on the basis of communities of interest both favor homogenous, hence safe, districts. 
 
D.   Measures beyond 2010 
Looking past the November 2010 election, we see more of the same. Two initiatives have 
qualified for the February 2012 ballot.  One measure, which falls in the “fix the politics” 
category, would change California’s term limits for state legislatures from eight years in the 
senate and six years in the assembly to a total of 12 years in one or both.  This measure would 
increase the average length of a legislative career because fewer than half of assembly members 
become state senators after serving six years in the assembly.  Thus, the measure would reduce 
the proportion of inexperienced legislators and increase the long-term accountability of 
legislators for current actions.  Most likely, this measure would lead to a small improvement in 
the functioning of the legislature, but the effect on the budget problem would be small in the 
absence of other measures that would reduce polarization of the parties and the inflexibility in 
the current system of state and local public finance. 
The second qualified measure, an example of the revenue/expenditure category, would   43
impose a higher tax on cigarettes and designate that the revenue be used for cancer research.  
This measure has the admirable feature of identifying a source of revenue to finance the 
proposed increase in expenditures.  The increase in the cigarette tax will cause a small reduction 
in cigarette consumption, which will reduce existing state revenue from the cigarette tax, thereby 
slightly worsening the state’s budget problem.  In the long run, this measure could reduce state 
expenditures on medical care for cancer patients, although this effect is likely to be small and 
will not be apparent for many years.  Like other expenditure measures, this proposition sets in 
concrete a decision to increase substantially state support for cancer research.  Given that the 
research that will emanate from this program will be a tiny fraction of total expenditures on 
cancer research by the federal government and various private foundations, the notion that in the 
current budget situation the best use of a new tax is to increase cancer research is certainly far 
from obvious.  Thus, this proposition is an excellent illustration of the dubious rationality of 
deciding the budget one issue at a time through ballot measures. 
Beyond measures that have qualified, numerous other initiatives that would directly or 
indirectly affect the state budget are in the process of gathering signatures.  These measures fall 
into same general categories of past measures, either adding still more unmanageable constraints 
to the state budget or to tinkering with governance in ways that by themselves are unlikely to 
have much effect on California’s perpetual budget crises.  What nearly all of these measures fail 
to do is address the deeper structural problems in comprehensive way. 
The exception to this generalization is a proposal to call a state constitutional convention 
that would be limited to reforming the budget process and the election system.  A constitutional 
convention could adopt a coherent system of constitutional reforms, which would be placed on 
the ballot for approval by the voters.  The supporters of this measure, a coalition of “good   44
government” citizens’ groups, originally sought to place this proposal on the November 2010 
ballot, but failed to qualify the measure.  Whether they will continue to try, and if so, whether 
they will succeed in qualifying the measure, remain open questions.  Nevertheless, a state 
constitutional convention is a fascinating proposal.  The advantage is that it could address all of 
the political institutions and past budget-related initiatives that have caused inflexibility and lack 
of accountability in California governance.  The disadvantage is that asking a small group of 
citizens not only to figure out a solution to California’s budget problem but to advocate it 
successfully to the voters, given the well-financed special interest opposition that comprehensive 
reform would generate, is indeed a tall order. 
 
V.  Conclusion:  Addressing Deeper Problems 
Discussing the fiscal situation in California without partisan considerations taking over is 
a difficult task.  Those who favor smaller government want more restrictions on taxes and 
expenditures, while those who favor more expansive government favor new programmatic 
initiatives.  Whatever one’s ideology and partisan affiliation, there should be agreement that the 
incentives of both citizens and their elected leaders should be aligned to foster responsible and 
accountable fiscal decision making.  This is not the case in California for three reasons. 
First, the effect of various initiative measures has been to restrict the capacity of local 
governments to raise revenue from local sources and to make the state responsible for paying for 
many local services.  The 1996 Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) recognized the need 
for rationalizing the responsibilities of state and local governments, given that local governments 
were sometimes using local revenues to provide state-mandated services and that the state was 
paying for local services.  The CRC proposed Home Rule Community Charters to sort out issues   45
of state versus local responsibilities and powers, but this proposal died with the Commission’s 
demise.  Subsequent initiative measures, such as Proposition 1A in 2004 and Proposition 22 in 
2010, have sought to protect local government spending in periods of lower revenue and to 
preserve and even expand the current system of high state transfers. 
In assessing the causes and cures of California’s budget problem, the mismatch between 
revenues and expenditures cannot be ignored.  While this mismatch does not account for all of 
California’s fiscal problems, it does account for the uniquely dysfunctional element of the state’s 
current situation.   Even if Community Charters are not the best answer, the realignment of state 
and local responsibilities and taxation power needs to go forward.  Communities should have the 
right to decide what level of local services they want to provide, but should bear primary 
responsibility for paying for the excess of spending over a state-determined and state-financed 
minimum.  In a diverse state, a closer connection between revenues and expenditures in each unit 
of government gives citizens choices about trade-offs between taxes and services. 
Second, the initiative process should be reformed.  Ballot box budgeting and institutional 
engineering is the source of much of the state’s current dysfunction.  Unless California’s popular 
initiative process is reformed, the state will continue to see more fiscal constraints and 
misaligned expenditure and tax decisions.  Unfortunately, despite three decades of discussion 
about initiative reform, and widespread agreement among many experts and close observers of 
California politics that the direct democracy system needs repair, there has been absolutely no 
progress on this front.  California voters like the idea that they govern themselves and make 
fiscal decisions even though the evidence is overwhelming that the cumulative effect of these 
decisions has been to cause the performance of state and local government to deteriorate.  
Meanwhile the initiative industry has become ever more professionalized and is heavily utilized   46
by political candidates and interest groups who want to take their legislative battle to a different 
arena.  Only one circulating measure deals with the initiative process, and it would seek to make 
initiatives more difficult to qualify for the ballot.  More importantly, California should reconsider 
whether fiscal policy should be decided by initiatives at all, and if so, whether by constitutional 
amendments and statutory measures that cannot be amended by the legislature.  Additional 
reforms that should be considered seriously are to sunset all initiatives after ten years, requiring 
reauthorization by the voters if they are to remain in force, and “pay as you go” requirements 
whereby proposals to cut taxes or to increase expenditures would be required to specify how they 
would be accommodated on the other side of the budget. 
Third, proponents of political reforms need to ask themselves what they are trying to 
achieve and then to use objective analysis to match their reform proposals to their goals.  If the 
purpose of reform is simply to make sure that budgets are timely, reducing the vote requirement 
for the budget but not for taxes may increase the frequency with which the budget is passed on 
time, but that is not the same as solving the budget problem.  If the goal is to eliminate the 
structural deficit by encouraging pay-go thinking and partisan compromise, this proposal is 
counter-productive because a system in which it is easier to pass the budget than to increase 
taxes will facilitate responding to the short term incentive to increase the structural deficit. 
If the larger political goal is to empower the ideological center in order to encourage 
partisan compromise, electoral and governmental reforms should be on the same page.  Adopting 
a simple majority rule will reduce the frequency of prolonged budget battles;  however, an effort 
to encourage more moderate elected officials through a new system for electing legislators can 
be neutralized by reducing the vote required for budget approval.  If voters do not like what they 
get, they can vote the majority party out of office. On the other hand, if the goal is to avoid   47
reversals of policy and to induce moderation, then supermajority votes plus the right electoral 
institutions are a more plausible solution.  In short, the goals of electoral and legislative reform 
cannot be divorced, and can be achieved only through one coherent package of proposals. 
To date, the debate about how to change the system of electing state legislators has been 
unimaginative, largely accepting some of the main causes of dysfunction in the legislature.  For 
example, two proposals that are worthy of serious consideration are vastly to increase the 
number of legislators and to move to a unicameral legislature (reducing the size of constituencies 
for any given total number of legislators).  Another proposal worth serious evaluation is to create 
a legislature in which some members are elected through proportional representation (party votes 
within either the entire state or regions within the state).  Proportional representation increases 
party unity, but allows small parties to obtain representation and is more likely to lead to centrist 
control of the legislature.  Still another reform that deserves consideration is to strengthen the 
authority and accountability of the governor by eliminating most state-wide elective executive 
offices and converting them to cabinet appointments. 
The unfortunate conclusion from this litany of reforms that are either actively under 
consideration or not being considered at all is that relief from the annual budget crisis is not 
likely to arrive any time soon.  If the cause, as argued here, is the death of a thousand cuts from a 
series of initiatives that have created a budgetary process that lacks accountability, the only 
solution is wholesale reform of California’s governance structure.  Such wholesale reform 
requires either many separate initiatives or a constitutional revision.  In either case, there are no 
obvious candidates to provide the energy and money to fix the problem.   48
TABLE 1:  TOTAL STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES 2008 – CALIFORNIA VS. U.S. 
(Figures in $ Billions) 
 
Category          U.S. Total              California 
            T o t a l    %   U . S .
a 
 
Gross Domestic Product         14,166      1,847      13.0 
Total S&L Net Revenue
b           2,660         354      13.3 
       S&L Tax Revenue           1,331         176      13.2 
       Federal Transfers               481           58      12.0 
       Fees and Charges
c              198           42      21.2 
       Social Insurance and Pensions              88            -1                   na 
Total S&L Expenditures
d           2,839         415      14.6 
       Salaries and Wages              801         115      14.4 
       Administration                127           22      18.2 
       Capital Outlays                349           47      13.4 
       Interest                  100           14      13.6 
       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Education                 826         104      12.6 
  Elementary & Secondary            566           71      12.5 
  College & University             223           30      13.2 
       Highways                 154           16      10.2 
       Sewage and Solid Waste               90           10      11.0 
       Welfare                  405           51      12.6 
       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Health Care                209           32      15.3 
       Police and Fire                129           22      17.1 
       Corrections                  73           14      18.8 
       Parks & Recreation                41             6      15.3 
       Housing & Development               51           10      20.2 
       Social Insurance and Pensions            235           41      17.4 
       S&L Owned Utilities              193           36      18.6 
 
Notes: 
a.  Because the first two columns are rounded and the third column is derived from unrounded 
numbers, the percentages in the last column differ from the ratio of the first two columns. 
b.  All revenues including net intergovernmental transfers. 
c.  The most important are college tuition, public hospital charges, highway tolls, charges for use 
of airports and ports, charges for sewage and solid waste disposal, public housing rent, and 
charges to customers of government-owned utilities. 
d.  Includes both capital and operating expenditures. 
 
Sources:  Bureau of the Census, “State and Local Government Finance by Level of Government 
and by State,” and Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Regional Economic Accounts,” both of which 
are released annually on the web site of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  49
 
TABLE 2:  TOTAL STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES 2005 – CALIFORNIA VS. U.S. 
(Figures in $ Billions)
a 
 
Category     U.S. Total         California 
                       Total           % U.S. 
 
Gross Domestic Product      12,339           1,629    13.2 
Total S&L Net Revenue        2,529       381    15.1 
    S&L Tax Revenue          1,099       147    13.4 
    Federal Transfers             439          55    12.5 
    Fees and Charges             513       111    21.6 
    Social Insurance and Pensions         383      88    23.0 
Total S&L Expenditures        2,364       339    14.3 
    Salaries and Wages            695         97    13.9 
    Capital Outlays             278      38    13.6 
    Interest                 92       12    13.4 
    S&L Owned Utilities           156      31    19.7 
    Social Insurance and Pensions         196      33    17.0 





a.   Notes and Sources for Table 1 also apply to Table 2. 
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TABLE 3:  REVENUES AND EXPEDNMITURES 
FOR LARGEST STATES, 2008 
 
         Calif.      Florida      Illinois   New York       Penn.      Texas 
 
State GDP ($billion)    1,847        744   634      1,144  553     1,224 
Budget Items % GDP 
Total Revenues      19.2        19.9  16.4        21.3  19.9      16.1 
   State        10.9          9.2    9.2        12.8  12.9        9.7 
Local        13.3        13.6    9.9        13.2  10.6        8.8 
      In-state Transfers
a         5.0          3.0    2.6          4.8    3.6        2.5 
      Federal Transfers        3.1          3.1    2.7          3.9    3.5        2.7 
      Tax Revenues      10.1          9.9    9.1        12.1    9.8        7.1 
State          6.3          4.8    5.0          5.7    5.8        3.7 
      Local          3.7          5.0    4.1          6.4    4.0        3.4 
        Property Tax        2.9          4.1    3.4          3.4    2.8        2.7 
        Sales Taxes        2.9          4.6    3.0          3.0    2.9        3.3 
        Pers. Income Tax      3.1          0.0    1.6          4.1    2.6        0.0 
        Corp. Income Tax      0.6          0.3    0.5          1.0    0.4        0.0 
      Fees & Utilities        4.7          1.8    1.3          1.5    4.6        1.1 
      Soc. Ins. & Pensions      0.0          0.4    0.8          0.2    1.7        1.8 
Total S&L Expenditures    22.5        21.2  18.3        23.0  20.2      15.4 
     State
b          8.5          7.7    7.7          9.2    9.7        6.0 
   Local
b       13.9        13.6  10.6        13.8  10.5        9.4 
      Salaries and Wages      6.2          5.6    5.5          6.5    5.0        4.8  
      Capital Outlays        2.5          3.4    2.1          2.8    2.2        2.7 
      Interest on Debt        0.7          0.7    0.9          0.9    0.9        0.7 
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      E&S Education        3.8          4.1    3.6          4.5    4.3        3.7 
      Higher Education       1.6          1.1    1.3          1.0    1.4        1.5 
      Police, Fire, Corrections      1.9          2.0    1.3          1.5    1.2        1.1 
      Welfare & Health       4.5          4.3    3.4          5.4    4.8        3.0 
      Highways         0.9          1.4    1.1          0.8    1.4        1.2 
      Sewage & Sol. Waste      0.5          0.7    0.3          0.6    0.5        0.3 
      Utilities          1.9          1.5    1.1          2.2    0.8        1.2 
      Administration        1.2          1.1    0.7          1.0    1.0        0.5 




a.  Gross transfers between state and local governments within state. 
b.  Not including transfers between state and local governments. 
 
Source:  Same as Table 1.   51
 
TABLE 4:  DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 2008
a 
(Figures in $ Billions) 
 
                U.S.        California 
               State      Local    State      Local 
                 Total        % U.S.      Total         % U.S. 
 
Total Revenues         1,619      1,531       201   12.4       246    16.1 
      Federal Transfers            423           58         49   11.6           8    14.3         
      Taxes              782         549       117   15.0         69    12.5 
      Fees                15           43           1     9.6         13    30.4 
      Utility Charges              17         123           5   32.7         21    17.3 
      Soc. Ins. & Pensions         83             6           1     1.7          -2       na 
Total Expenditures         1,734      1,593      247    14.2       259    16.3 
    Salaries and Wages           230         571        28    12.1         87    15.2 
    Administration              52           75          9    16.9         14    18.3 
    Interest on Debt              45           55          6    12.6           8    14.3 
    Intrastate Transfers
b          477           16        94    19.6           1      3.8 
Direct Expenditures         1,257      1,577      153    12.2       259    16.4 
        Education            232         594        23    10.1         81    13.6 
  Elem. & Sec.                8         557          X      5.1         70    12.6 
  Higher             187           37        19    10.3         10    27.9 
        Welfare              354           51        35      9.9         16    31.4 
        Health Care              92         117        10    11.2         22    18.5 
        Highways              91           63          8      9.1           7    11.8 
        Police & Fire              12         117          2    13.5         20    17.4 
        Corrections              47           26          8    17.9           5    20.5 
        Parks & Rec.                6           35         X      7.6           6    16.5 
        Hous. & Dev.    11           40         X      2.5         10    24.9 
        Sew. & Sol. Waste            4           67          1    38.3           8    12.7 
        Utilities                26         167          5    20.0         31    18.4 




a.  Notes and sources in Table 1 apply to Table 3. 
b.  From state to local and from local to state. 
X indicates less than $500 million. 